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Abstract
Semen Frank (1877–1950) was one of the first and most ardent advocates of the 
ontological argument in the twentieth century. He proposed an original interpreta-
tion of the ontological argument based on its analogy to Descartes’ Cogito. Frank 
believed that it is possible to develop Cogito ergo sum into Cogito ergo est ens abso-
lutum. In this paper, I analyze his version of the ontological argument. First, I pro-
pose a simple reconstruction of his reasoning, paying attention to its hidden premise. 
Second, departing from the classical logical interpretations of Descartes’ argument, 
I show that for Frank the claim that God exists had the same logical properties as 
Cogito. As a result, it seems that his argument was formally correct, though based 
on a premise which could hardly be convincing for a non-believer. This should not 
be surprising, however, since Frank, as most Russian religious philosophers, was 
not interested in the project of philosophical theology. His main concern was rather 
the development of philosophy based on religious premises, which might be called 
“theological philosophy”.
Keywords Semen Frank · Ontological argument · Cogito · Pragmatics · 
Performatives
The great Russian religious philosopher, Semen L. Frank (1877–1950), confessed, 
several months before his death, to his son Viktor:
I had one real philosophical revelation. It was in Munich in 1913, when I was 
writing The Object of Knowledge. I had reached a certain boundary and got 
into a dead end. I gave up writing and wandered around the room thinking for 
a whole week. Then there was a flowing of blood to the head, and I decided to 
leave everything and rest. And then in the night a voice said to me: “Can’t you 
understand a simple thing? Why start from consciousness? Start from being!” 
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I said to him: “Sum, ergo cogito”, and he replied, “No, rather, Cogito ergo est 
esse absolutum” (Boobbyer 1995, p. 83–84).
Philip Boobbyer, Frank’s biographer, who recalled this story, noticed that “this 
description of this moment of inspiration provides an excellent setting for the main 
themes of The Object of Knowledge” (Boobbyer 1995, p. 84). For the main point of 
Frank’s thesis was precisely the transition from the primacy of consciousness, which 
he called “epistemologism,” to the primacy of being, called “ontologism”. The tran-
sition, however, did not rely on a simple reversal of Descartes’ approach, but on its 
deepening. The proof of the existence of a subject, namely cogito ergo sum, was 
to be transformed into a proof of the existence of an absolute being, namely cogito 
ergo est esse absolutum. Hence, the mysterious voice suggested to Frank an idea 
crucial for his system, namely the new ontological proof for the existence of God.
Frank was one of the greatest defenders of ontological proofs and the precursor 
of the rebirth of interest in these arguments in the twentieth century. As he admitted 
himself, “from all the proofs for the existence of God this one has the worst reputa-
tion”, and “from the times of Kant it is believed to be a sophism whose absurdity 
and degree of intellectual fraud is almost self-evident” (Frank 1972, p. 110). Despite 
that, he firmly claimed:
in this doctrine there is no accidental mistake or bizarre fantasy of an errant 
abstract thought, but an idea which occupied the minds of presumably the 
deepest thinkers and which constitutes in some sense the main problem and, in 
our conviction, also the main truth of philosophy (Frank 2000, p. 630).
In a number of his works, Frank propounded a very original interpretation of the 
ontological argument. Contrary to what he believed, his view was not merely a 
reconstruction, but rather a creative development of this proof. This new interpreta-
tion was apparently offered by a mysterious voice in his dream. Frank noticed that 
ontological proof, properly understood, shares characteristics with cogito sentences 
(I shall refer to in this way Cartesian sentences “I think” and “I exist”). For the argu-
mentation of Anselm, as well as that of Descartes, refers to some existential sen-
tences which cannot be reasonably negated. In the case of cogito, it is the existence 
of thinking subject, while in the case of Ratio Anselmi—the existence of the Abso-
lute. Frank believed that such comparison throws new light on the value of ontologi-
cal proof. “It seems inconceivable”, he wrote about cogito, “that one can acknowl-
edge the certainty of this formula and still renounce the power of ontological proof” 
(Frank 2000, p. 213). Unfortunately, Frank’s original proposition went unnoticed by 
philosophers dealing with the ontological proof. His most important texts on this 
issue were written in Russian and not easy accessible. The great contemporary dis-
cussion on Anselm’s argument, initiated in analytical philosophy soon after Frank’s 
death in works by Norman Malcolm (1960) and Charles Hartshorne (1967), and 
then continued by David Lewis (1970), Alvin Plantinga (1974) and many others 
(see Sobel 2004, pp. 29–167; Oppy 2006, pp. 49–96; Szatkowski 2012 for a review 
of recent debates), has been carried on without taking into account his proposition. 
This is a pity since Frank outlined a completely alternative way of reading Anselm.
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In this article, I would like to take a closer look at ontological proof as proposed 
by Frank. I will investigate systematically the analogy indicated by Frank between 
Anselm’s ontological argument and Descartes’ cogito. As it happens, cogito ergo 
sum was the subject of interesting discussions in analytic philosophy, which may be 
used to analyze cogito ergo est ens absolutum. First, I will analyze various contexts 
in which the ontological proof appears in Frank’s works, and present its dominant 
interpretation. Then I will turn to two key points in his discussion of the proof: the 
criticism of Anselm’s standard formulation from the second chapter of the Proslo-
gion and the comparison of the ontological argument with Cartesian cogito. The 
comparison allows an understanding of how Frank reformulated the traditional 
ontological argument. He pointed out that, assuming that the existence of an abso-
lute being is a necessary condition of the existence of finite beings, the negation of 
God’s existence leads to the same existential and pragmatic contradiction as negat-
ing one’s own being. The status of the sentence “God exists” is hence similar to the 
status of the sentence “I exist”. However, the consequence of such a reformulation 
of the ontological argument, which apparently Frank did not realize, is a weakening 
of the concept of the Absolute. For the existence of God turns out to be not logi-
cally, but merely pragmatically, necessary. Frank’s argument, as I will undertake to 
show, is fundamentally correct. Unfortunately, its whole weight lies in the hidden 
premise, namely a necessary relation of finite beings with the Absolute, the adoption 
of which may be explicitly regarded as an expression of belief in God.
Frank and the ontological argument
Semen Frank attended to ontological proof in his works several times, indicating, in 
turn, its role in the theory of knowledge, tracking its long and intricate history, and 
analyzing its significance for the philosophy of religion. For the first time, analysis of 
the ontological proof appears in a chapter of the abovementioned fundamental work 
The Object of Knowledge published in Russia in 1915 (Frank 2000, pp. 211–218). 
In general, the study concerns epistemology, and the ontological argument appears 
in the context of reflections on idealism (Obolevitch 2007). Frank wonders how to 
leave the sphere of subjectivity. If there were some notions necessarily requiring the 
existence of their objects, one could infer the existence of something more than only 
the stream of consciousness. Generally speaking, ontological proofs indicate pre-
cisely such notions. “Their point is”, says Frank, “can one think of something whose 
notion would contain its own existence, something whose existence would be logi-
cally necessary?” (Frank 2000, p. 211; see also Frank 2000, pp. 547–548). In that 
broad understanding, it turns out that Cartesian cogito is naturally an ontological 
argument for the existence of the subject (Frank 2000, p. 589). Another step is the 
developing of cogito reasoning into the argument for the existence of the Absolute. 
So, in this way, the paradigm of a philosophy of consciousness is overcome. The 
fundamental point of the new theory of knowledge is no longer an individual subject 
(as in Descartes), but the all-encompassing Absolute.
Frank added to his Object of Knowledge a comprehensive supplement, entitled 
“From the History of the Ontological Argument”, published previously as a separate 
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text (Frank 2000, pp. 545–630). Dmitrii Chizhevskii, an excellent historian of phi-
losophy, believed this work to be “one of the most significant pieces of historical-
philosophical research in Russian” (Chizhevskii 1954, p. 165). Frank convincingly 
showed that the history of ontological argument neither began with Anselm nor 
ended with Kant (Frank 2000, p. 30). He saw the traces of this reasoning as early 
as Parmenides (Frank 2000, pp. 553–554), he discovered a certain version of the 
ontological argument for the existence of soul in Plato’s Phaedo (pp. 554–562), and 
found a well-developed proof for the existence of God in Plotinus (pp. 562–566). 
Frank was one of the first to distinguish clearly between two versions of the argu-
ment in the second and third chapters of Anselm’s Proslogion (Frank 2000, pp. 
574–581), which started to be universally accepted in literature only 50 years after 
his works. He devoted much attention to the development of ontological argumenta-
tion in his favorite philosopher, Nicholas of Cusa (Frank 2000, pp. 581–588). Inter-
estingly enough, Frank treated Descartes’ formulation of the ontological proof for 
God’s existence deprecatingly. As he believed, his formulation “did not contribute 
anything, on the contrary—it impeded showing the persuasive power of this argu-
ment” (Frank 1972, p. 134). However, of crucial importance in Frank’s version 
of the proof was its comparison with Cartesian cogito and reference to his theory 
of infinity (Frank 2000, p. 592). Frank also showed that the famous criticism for-
mulated by Kant had already been in Gaunilo’s and Gassendi’s writings (Frank 
2000, p. 576). Kant’s charges, he thought, were rebutted by Hegel, whose version 
of the proof he nevertheless supposed to be merely a reformulation of Fichte’s and 
Schelling’s interpretations (Frank 2000, p. 627, cf. however Rojek 2011). Frank’s 
study, although aimed to endorse his own interpretation, still remains a surprisingly 
inspiring and broad view of the history of the ontological argument.
Frank returned to the issue of the ontological argument a dozen or so years later 
in a bulky paper “The Ontological Proof for the Existence of God”, presented in 
1930 at the Russian emigré Scientific Institute in Belgrade, on the invitation of Peter 
Struve (Frank 1972). Frank’s interesting notes from this period, found in the philos-
opher’s archive in New York, have been published recently (Frank 2017; Obolevitch 
and Tsygankov 2017). Frank developed his interpretation of the ontological argu-
ment and placed it in the new context of the philosophy of religion, up until then his 
reflections on the proof were mainly grounded in the theory of knowledge (Antonov 
2015, pp. 13–14). He pointed out that God, as discovered in the ontological argu-
ment, is not an external object but reveals itself directly in the subject. Such a con-
cept of God is much closer to real religious experience than that inspired by the cos-
mological arguments. As Frank recalled, according to St. John, “The one who keeps 
God’s commands  lives in him,  and he in them” (1 John 3: 24). Hence, he stated, 
“this proof is nothing other than a rational recognition of the specific certainty of 
religious experience” (Frank 1972, p. 151).
In recent years, Frank’s ontological argument has finally started to draw the 
attention of scholars (Kotsiuba 2001; Augustyn 2003, pp. 86–96; Obolevitch 
and Wszołek 2004; Obolevitch 2006, pp. 193–208; Aliaev 2009; Ehlen 2009, 
pp. 190–195; Obolevitch and Sajdek 2011; Dobieszewski 2012; Dushin 2014; 
Obolevitch and Tsygankov 2017). Most typically, Frank’s proof is interpreted in 
the context of his statements relating it to the philosophy of religion, whereas the 
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role of this reasoning in his theory of knowledge is usually neglected. Hence, his 
argument is most often simply taken as an expression of personal religious expe-
rience, not as reasoning which can be subject to rational assessment. Vladimir 
Ilʹin, one of the first commentators on Frank, wrote that “the life of the onto-
logical argument is a prayer,” which is “the life of the Absolute, shining through 
as a bright flame and bubbling up as a crystal spring” (Ilʹin 1954, pp. 98, 99). 
Similarly, Oleg Dushin, the author of one of the most recent studies, wrote that, 
according to Frank, the basis of the ontological proof is not “simply the extent of 
logical justification and correctness of rules of reasoning” but rather “the pres-
ence of living experience of faith” (Dushin 2014, p. 53). The sense of the onto-
logical proof is interpreted in the same spirit by Teresa Obolevitch and her vari-
ous collaborators:
This argument is not about discovering the truth about the existence of God, 
or convincing those who think differently, but merely about expressing it. The 
argument is only—and as much as—the testimony of faith, and this is where 
its power, and weakness lie. “Confirmation” that can occur in so-called onto-
logical proof, is of the same nature as mystical experience, and not a rational 
justification or empirical verification (Obolevitch and Sajdek 2011, p. 185; see 
also Obolevitch and Wszołek 2004, pp. 43–44; Obolevitch 2006, p. 197, 199; 
Obolevitch and Tsygankov 2017, p. 107).
I would like to propose a different interpretation of Frank’s ontological argument, 
by developing his remarks formulated in an epistemological, not religious context. 
My aim is to show that it is not only an expression of his religious intuitions, but 
also an original rational argument. Frank’s proof seems formally correct, though 
based on a premise which cannot be accepted by someone who does not acknowl-
edge the existence of God. Eventually, indeed, it may turn out that Frank’s argu-
ment cannot be used to convince “those who think differently”, but it is not like that 
because it is merely a non-discursive report from his personal mystical experience.
Let me briefly summarize key ideas of Frank’s ontological proof. In all his state-
ments on this issue, Frank returned to two fundamental thoughts. The first indicated 
what the ontological argument is not, while the second explained its proper sense. 
For example, in the article “The Ontological Proof for the Existence of God” he 
wrote:
The sense of the ontological argument is not that through analysis of some 
abstract idea, not having a necessary relation with reality, through some “mag-
ical” reasoning or logical trick, we reach the statement of reality of its object 
(Frank 1972, p. 115).
This negative thesis was related to Frank’s constantly repeated criticism of Anselm’s 
formulation from the second chapter of Proslogion, which he believed to be source 
of most misunderstandings of ontological argument. Shortly after that, Frank formu-
lated a positive thesis:
The sense of this argument lies in that from the beginning we have here not 
an abstract idea but the very fullness of reality, and looking at it we see that 
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otherwise we could not have this subject at all, i.e. that here we cannot carry 
out a normal logical differentiation between an “idea” and its “reality” (Frank 
1972, p. 115).
This thesis was illustrated with reference to the cogito argument from Descartes’ 
second meditation. Similar formulations may be found in all places in which Frank 
spoke of the ontological proof (Frank 2000, pp. 216, 624–625; Frank 1983, pp. 
216–17). In the next sections of this paper I will deal with these two theses. First, I 
will look at his criticism of Anselm’s reasoning, and then his analysis of Cartesian 
argumentation.
Anselm’s argument
Frank criticised the popular version of ontological argument very harshly. In his 
opinion, “the true meaning” of the ontological argument has been “essentially dis-
torted by all his foes and critics” (Frank 1983, p. 216). Frank thought that the source 
of these distortions was the first unfortunate formulation of the argument, presented 
in the second chapter of Anselm’s Proslogion. However, as he stated:
This failed form of reflection, which was taken over by his supporters as well 
as opponents, then repeated by Descartes, and until now remains a favorite 
object of mocking and training in logical quickness, does not correspond with 
the essence of Anselm’s thought at all (Frank 2000, p. 578).
The second version of the argument, presented by Anselm in the third chapter of 
Proslogion, and even better in reply to criticism of Gaunilion, is, according to Frank, 
much more adequate. The comparison of both versions of Anselm’s argument 
reveals, as I believe, how Frank himself understood the very nature of ontological 
proof.
In the first version of his proof, Anselm hypothetically assumed the existence of 
an empty concept of God and concluded that it would be contradictory. He wrote in 
Proslogion II:
Now we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be 
thought. So can it be that no such nature exists, since “The fool has said in 
his heart, ‘There is no God’”? But when this same fool hears me… he surely 
understands what he hears; and what he understands exists in his understand-
ing, even if he does not understand that it exists [in reality]… And surely that 
than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist only in the understanding. 
For if it exists only in the understanding, it can be thought to exist in reality as 
well, which is greater (Anselm 2007, pp. 81–82).
According to Frank, this is a hopeless attempt “to draw the reality of a thing from 
the very concept”, namely “of transforming in some magical way the originally only 
assumed, imagined content of a thought into apodictically certain existence of its 
object” (Frank 2000, p. 215). However, as he says, “it is obvious that, from the con-
tent of a thought, abstract from any reference to being, being itself can by no means 
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be extracted” (Frank 2000, p. 215). In that situation, acknowledging the reality of 
a thing becomes a “logical leap” and thus “an elementary logical mistake” (Frank 
1972, p. 114). Hence, the ontological argument in this version is “unjustified” 
(Frank 2000, p. 215) and “obviously groundless” (Frank 1972, p. 111).
I do not think this criticism of Frank is justified. It seems to me that he does 
not see clearly enough that the first argument of Anselm is an indirect proof. For 
Anselm assumes first the existence of God in mind only, and then shows that such a 
concept is contradictory. Therefore, criticism of the hypothesis rejected by Anselm 
is completely ineffective. Frank’s misunderstanding of the logical character of the 
first argument can be best seen when he accuses it of contradiction: “naturally, it 
is not hard to notice that in this form the proof is internally contradictory” (Frank 
2000, p. 575); and in another place: “the reasoning is internally inconsistent and 
hence unjustified” (Frank 1972, p. 124). Obviously, it can be no other way since this 
is explicitly an indirect proof. The contradiction at which Anselm arrives proves pre-
cisely that God cannot be only a conceived being.
According to Frank, a much better formulation of ontological argument is pre-
sented in Proslogion III:
This [something than which nothing greater can be thought—P. R.] exists so 
truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist. For it is possible to think that 
something exists that cannot be thought not to exist, and such a being is greater 
than one that can be thought not to exist… So that than which a greater cannot 
be thought exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist (Anselm 
2007, p. 72)
Frank commented on the second version of the Anselm’s argument in the following 
way:
At first sight it is hard to notice a crucial difference between this form of argu-
ment and that presented above; yet, the difference occurs indeed, in that the 
reflection does not at all start with the concept of God as only conceived, in 
order to subsequently derive from it his necessary being, but rather starts with 
the statement that the concept of God as the absolute maximum cannot be con-
ceived otherwise as encompassing in itself the real existence of God (Frank 
200, pp. 578–579).
In other words, there is no assumption of the indirect proof which caused Frank’s 
unease, namely that one can think of something that in fact cannot be thought of. 
To Frank, Anselm’s wording from the first chapter was only “a psychological and 
didactic means” (Frank 2000, p. 580) that had to facilitate grasping the main idea 
presented in the third chapter, namely “the contradiction of a hypothetical concept 
of God” (ibid.). For the fundamental intuition of the ontological argument is that 
there “are things… which are given to our thought in such a way that their very real-
ity is given to us immediately and necessarily” (Frank 1972, p. 115).
According to some commentators, Frank was the first philosopher who distin-
guished the two versions of Anselm’s ontological proof, a distinction which was 
later independently discovered by Malcom and Hartshorne and widely accepted in 
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the literature (Obolevitch and Tsygankov 2017, p. 110). It seems however that the 
grounds for these distinctions were quite different. While Frank considered the sec-
ond argument merely a more adequate version of the first form, Malcolm and Hart-
shorne saw there a fundamentally new concept of God as a necessary being. Such 
being is either impossible, or necessary, and since it is possible, it exists (Malcolm 
1960; Hartshorne 1967). No such claim can be found in Frank’s version. For this 
reason, it is hard to recognize that he in any way anticipated later discussions of the 
ontological argument in analytical philosophy. His thinking went in a completely 
different direction. He did not analyze—as I will show later—the necessity of the 
existence of God in itself, but rather pointed to the necessary relation of the thinking 
subject to God. For this reason, Frank’s version seems to be an original and unique 
development of the ontological argument.
Cartesian Cogito
Frank’s most original idea was a positive attempt to explain the nature of the onto-
logical argument. He wrote:
In order to understand the sense of this statement and notice at least its pos-
sibility, let us turn to… argumentation, which at first sight has nothing in com-
mon with ontological proof for the existence of God, and which enjoys very 
widespread recognition as a paradigm of a logically self-evident thesis. I mean 
here cogito ergo sum by Descartes (Frank 1972, p. 115).
For Frank, then, Cartesian cogito was to be an explanation of ontological proof. 
Besides, Frank believed cogito itself to be a kind of version of ontological proof, 
as in his opinion this concept was not limited only to arguments for God’s existence 
(Frank 2000, pp. 547–548). What were the ontological arguments to be then?
An ontological argument claims that being is not always something alien to an 
idea and belonging to it externally. On the contrary, there are some points in 
which being and thinking merge, unite directly and inevitably. It points to the 
presence of the contents of thought, whose meaning essentially transcends the 
boundaries of their content, in which, on the contrary, being appears directly, 
if one may say so, it shows through. Such are the concepts of being and con-
sciousness, such is also the concept of God, because God is understood as the 
primary foundation and bearer of being and reason (Frank 2000, p. 217, italics 
mine).
The very existence of the concepts that can serve as the basis for ontological argu-
ments would be impossible if the objects to which they refer did not exist. Acknowl-
edgement of their presence is thus simultaneously acknowledgement of the exist-
ence of their designates. Frank indicated in this respect three concepts: being, 
consciousness and God. Cartesian cogito is an ontological argument for the exist-
ence of consciousness and being, while Ratio Anslemi is an ontological argument 
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for the existence of God. As it will turn out, Frank believed they virtually form one 
comprehensive argument.
Cartesian reasoning in the second meditation, like the first version of Anselm’s 
argument, has the form of indirect proof. Descartes assumes that he is in the power 
of an omnipotent deceiver, but it turns out that even under such circumstances he 
cannot doubt his own thinking and his own existence.
But there is some deceiver or other who is supremely powerful and supremely 
sly and who is always deliberately deceiving me. Then too there is no doubt 
that I exist, if he is deceiving me. And let him do his best at deception, he will 
never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I shall think that I am some-
thing. Thus, after everything has been most carefully weighed, it must finally 
be established that this pronouncement “I am, I exist” is necessarily true every 
time I utter it or conceive it in my mind (Descartes 2006, p. 13).
Interestingly, this time Frank does not mind the form of Cartesian argument. In The 
Object of Knowledge he analyzed two forms or two aspects this argument. The first 
concerned the idea of consciousness, and the second the idea of being. Both can be 
related to elements of Cartesian cogito ergo sum: the former with cogito, the latter 
with sum.
First, as Frank pointed out, Descartes discovered that one cannot reasonably 
doubt the very existence of consciousness. He wrote:
I may negate and doubt any content of my thoughts but not the very thought 
or consciousness in itself: doubting, itself being a thought, cannot apply to the 
thought itself. Any attempt at doubting in the existence of thought ascertains 
it by the very fact of doubting (Frank 2000, pp. 204–205; see also his Frank 
1972, p. 120).
Therefore, consciousness cannot be merely a thought. The presence of its idea is at 
the same time the evidence of its existence. “A thought necessarily becomes aware 
that it exists, hence a thought merely being thought is internally contradictory… it is 
a typical ontological proof” (Frank 2000, p. 590).
Second, the very idea of being has the same exceptional logical feature. Thinking 
that there is no being is as contradictory as thinking that there is no thought, for the 
very thought is a being.
One may reasonably question whether there exists some particular idea 
because it means asking: Is this idea part of being? However, one may not ask: 
Does being itself exist? For the thought which is expressed by the question 
“Does exist…?”, itself presupposes this being (Frank 1972, p. 120; see also 
Frank 2000, p. 205).1
As Frank remarked, so we discover that being is not something external to the 
thinking subject. As he wrote, “the great illuminating sense” of cogito is that 
1 I disregard here another Frank’s formulation of ontological proof for the existence of being, which 
seems plainly incorrect to me (Frank 2000, p. 213).
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there is a being which is not given through consciousness but reveals itself 
“completely directly, a being, which we know precisely because we are it our-
selves” (Frank 2000, p. 205). Frank, however, was very cautious as regards to 
defining the status of this being. He agreed with Lichtenberg’s criticism, essen-
tially repeated by Solov’ev, that Descartes could at most prove the existence of 
a thought and not the subject of the thought (Lichtenberg 2012, p. 152; Solov’ev 
1988, pp. 781–782). As Frank wrote, cogito ergo sum should hence be weakened 
to cogito ergo est cogitatio (Frank 2000, p. 204). In each case, however, the 
existence of something is stated, regardless of its being only an idea in mind or a 
thinking subject. This suffices to pass from a thought to a being. “At least in one 
little sphere, in our consciousness, we have being not only for consciousness but 
also really existing” (Frank 2000, p. 205).
Frank believed that these two “ontological arguments” avoid the standard 
criticism that applies to the argument for the existence of God. According to 
Kant’s classic objection, every idea may be thought as non-existing. However, to 
Frank, the concepts of consciousness and being were the exceptions of this rule, 
for the very possibility of thinking them proves that they are not merely ideas.
It would be unreasonable to say that being and consciousness are concepts 
only… On the contrary, they are examples of such ideas which are insepa-
rable from the thought about the existence of their objects, and more pre-
cisely—such concepts for which the distinction between “an idea only” and 
“the real existence of the object” makes no sense (Frank 2000, p. 214; see 
also Frank 1972, p. 116).
Frank thought that ontological proof in the strict sense, namely an argument 
for the existence of God, has the same nature as the Cartesian arguments for 
the existence of consciousness and being. As in the case of consciousness and 
being, one cannot have the idea of God if God does not exist.
When reflecting on what we understand when we think of an idea of the 
Absolute we become convinced with direct self-evidence that any nega-
tions or doubts towards it are simply impossible and pointless, and thus it 
has necessary existence (Frank 2000, p. 581).
However, the necessity of God’s existence does not follow—as it is usually 
thought, both by supporters and critics of the ontological argument—from the 
very content of the idea of God, who presumably is to be a necessary being, but 
rather from the very act of having the idea of God, which necessarily requires 
God to exist. It is not a logical necessity in a strict sense but rather a pragmatic 
one. The concept of God, therefore, is supposed to have a similar nature as the 
concepts of consciousness or being. One cannot have them if there are no objects 
to which they refer. Thanks to this modification, Frank’s argument avoids classic 
charges leveled by Gaunilon, Gassendi or Kant. I think that Frank’s proposition 
is in fact a new version of the traditional ontological argument. Anselm’s argu-
ment is reformulated here following the pattern of Cartesian reasoning. Now I 
will take a closer look at the passage from cogito to ens absolutum.
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Cogito ergo est ens absolutum
Frank interpreted the Cartesian cogito as an ontological proof for the existence of 
consciousness and being. As Descartes showed, one cannot think of the concept 
of consciousness or being as not having their objects, for the very fact of think-
ing them proves that one is conscious and hence that something exists. Frank 
believed that this pertains to the concept of God as well, namely that the Car-
tesian position is only a step from an ontological argument for the existence of 
God. “A detailed analysis of Cartesian cogito, ergo sum shows”, he wrote, “that 
this claim turns into truth: Cogito, ergo est esse absolutum” (Frank 1972, p. 120). 
It is noteworthy that this is the sentence that the mysterious voices suggested to 
Frank in his dream.
However, this passage, crucial in all Frank’s philosophy, seems quite unclear. 
In many places, Frank affirmed that in the very act of cogito not only individual 
consciousness and finite being are revealed but also the Absolute itself.
What the ontological argument expressed in the Cartesian formula cogito 
ergo sum applies to is neither “my individual I” nor even “I in general” or 
“epistemological subject,” but the Absolute as such (Frank 1972, p. 119).
Clearly, the Absolute was understood by Frank not epistemologically as a being 
above the distinction between subject and object, which could be accepted, but 
metaphysically, as “absolute life, so to say an alive trembling of the deepest 
primitive source of all which can be thought and which exists” (Frank 1972, p. 
119). Surprisingly enough, many commentators regard this highly controversial 
passage as quite natural. Giennadii Aliaev, for instance, states:
Cogito is a self-revelation of reality, but not the reality of “I” as a subject, 
inevitably limited and relative, but the absolute reality in which the act of 
thinking and its content merge into one. In this way, cogito really becomes 
ontological proof for the existence of Absolute as such, namely God (Aliaev 
2009, p. 156).
Similarly, Peter Ehlen simply ascertains that “what Descartes proves by the cog-
ito formulation is not the existence of separate I but an Absolute being as such” 
(Ehlen 2009, p. 192). Despite this, it seems that the direct passage from cogito to 
esse absolutum is plainly unjustified. It is simply not clear how cogito experience 
may indeed reveal the Absolute.
Yet, in Frank’s works, an attempt at a justification and clarification of this pas-
sage can be found. He pointed out that the notions of consciousness and being, 
the fundaments of the Cartesian cogito, are specially related to the concept of 
God, which is relevant in the ontological argument. For, as he wrote, “God is 
understood as the original foundation and bearer of being and reason” (Frank 
2000, p. 217, italics mine). If God is the foundation of being and consciousness, 
then maybe their concepts are necessarily connected with the concept of God. If 
that was the case, the transition from cogito to ens absolutum would be somehow 
justified. Frank developed this idea by analyzing further statements of Descartes 
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from Meditations. As already mentioned, he was not interested in the proper 
Cartesian argument for the existence of God from the fifth meditation, which he 
believed to be faultily presented (Descartes 2006, pp. 36–39; Frank 1972, pp. 
133–134). However, Frank was very enthusiastic about the argument for God’s 
existence from infinity in the third meditation, in which he saw “admirable, deep 
intuition,” (Frank 2000, p. 592) which was “an essential moment of the real onto-
logical proof” (Frank 1972, p. 134). Descartes wrote:
Nor should I think that I do not perceive the infinite by means of a true idea, 
but only through a negation of the finite… On the contrary, I clearly under-
stand that… the perception of the infinite is somehow prior in me to the per-
ception of the finite, that is, my perception of God is prior to my perception of 
myself (Descartes 2006, p. 25).
In other words, to Descartes the concept of a finite being is secondary to concept of 
an infinite being, and hence the concept of a finite subject presupposes the concept 
of Absolute. As Frank wrote:
By virtue of these remarks it becomes clear that what is primarily and directly 
given to us is not “our consciousness” but the idea of infinite being. Descartes 
did not draw the natural conclusion from this that thereby we have the one and 
only real ontological argument for the existence of God, and that cogito, ergo 
sum would fundamentally have to be transformed after these explications into 
cogito, ergo est ens infinitum (Frank 2000, pp. 594–595).
In this way, thanks to Descartes’ findings, his cogito may be improved and devel-
oped into an ontological argument for God’s existence. Cogito alone appears to be 
only “the first step… towards realising the original self-evidence of infinite being, 
namely God” (Frank 1972, p. 136). The missing premise of the reasoning is the nec-
essary relation of a finite and accidental being with an infinite and necessary one. 
Therefore, it looks like Frank’s ontological argument for God’s existence is just a 
strengthened version of Cartesian cogito. It relies on noticing that one cannot negate 
the existence of one’s own finite being and that the existence of finite being presup-
poses the existence of the Absolute. In this way, the existence of God is as self-
evident as the existence of our own selves.
Let me try to reconstruct this cogito ergo est ens absolutum argument. It seems 
that it has two separate premises:
(1) I exist,
(2) □ (If I exist, God exists),
from which, by modus ponens, plainly follows the conclusion:
(3) God exists.
Premise (1) is a part of Cartesian cogito. One could obviously start also with “I 
think”, but “I exist” simplifies the proof and has the same epistemological status 
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as “I think”. This status, as I will show, is passed down to the conclusion of the 
argument.
Premise (2) is crucial to the whole proof. It expresses intuition that the exist-
ence of a finite being is conditioned by the existence of an infinite being. God is 
an Absolute being, the ultimate source of existence for everything else. If there 
were no God, there would be no anything. Especially, there would not be finite 
subjects reflecting upon God’s being. This is particularly evident in contraposi-
tion (2):
 (2′) □ (If God does not exist, then I do not exist.)
Cartesian reflection on infinity was aimed to express precisely this intuition. This 
formula however grasps Frank’s even more general and fundamental conviction 
that the world is essentially dependent on God. Hence, formula (2) expresses a 
basic religious insight on the contingency of all things and the necessity of God. 
For this reason, it seems doubtful whether it could be accepted by someone who 
does not accept the existence of God. For Frank’s argument, the most important 
is that, on religious grounds, the existence of God turns out to be as undeniable as 
the existence of our own selves.
Conclusion (3) and premise (2), as they stand, concern God, though perhaps 
they should refer to a more abstract Absolute. What is meant here is the being 
which is the source of other beings. The relation of this philosophical Absolute 
to the God of religion is a separate problem, which Frank considered the greatest 
problem of his ontological proof (Frank 1972), and which I will not address here 
(Zelinsky 2015).
The passage from (1) to (3) is formally correct. It is worth noticing that, 
although premise (2) is necessary, the very conclusion of the argument, according 
to the rules of modal logic, is not necessary because premise (1) is not necessary. 
However, the latter is undeniable, hence the conclusion may be regarded as evi-
dent as well.
Frank’s ontological argument in such formulation unexpectedly proves to 
be a specific combination of Ratio Anselmi, Cartesian cogito and, for instance, 
the Third Way of St. Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, premise (2) may be viewed as 
an expression of classic intuition that an accidental being requires a necessary 
being for its existence (ST I, 2, 3c). However, while the starting point for Aquinas 
could be any accidental being, for Frank it was a particular being of the thinking 
“I”. This starting point is the only trace of the ontological nature of the argu-
ment, for its beginning is a concept which cannot be empty, or rather a sentence 
in whose truth one cannot reasonably doubt. However, cogito serves here only to 
strengthen premise (1), which seems to be the strongest link of the whole argu-
ment. Frank’s argument is based on premise (2), which is adopted without any 
discussion. In Aquinas, for instance, it was a subject of a separate, quite complex 
(and also incorrect) proof (Bochenski 2000, pp. 77–81).
The most striking thing in Frank’s ontological proof is that the conclusion 
has the same specific epistemological status as its first premise. The sentence “I 
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exist” is true whenever someone says it. This makes up the compelling power of 
Cartesian cogito, which is universally accepted as undeniable. Now I will show 
that, on the grounds of the adopted premise (2), the conclusion “God exists” has 
the same distinguished status. Hence, Frank was right when he claimed that if 
one acknowledges the obviousness of cogito, then one should also acknowledge 
his argument for God’s existence (provided that, naturally, one also accepts the 
hidden premise just analyzed). For one cannot reasonably deny God’s existence. 
If God did not exist, there would be no one to reflect on such a matter. Stating 
God’s existence is therefore of similar status as stating one’s own existence. To 
show this precisely, I will first examine the logical peculiarities of the sentence 
“I exist”, and subsequently, assuming premise (2) without further discussion, in a 
similar way I will analyze the sentence “God exists”.
The analysis of Cogito
Since the very beginning of analytical philosophy there is a discussion on the pecu-
liar character of the Cartesian cogito (Russell 1905; Scholz 1931; Łukasiewicz 
1938; Ayer 1953). The sentence:
(1) I exist
is particularly problematic to analyze. First, it is a singular existential sentence, and 
such sentences were not, for a long time, due to Frege’s influence, acceptable in ana-
lytical philosophy. Second, it contains a personal pronoun, hence it is occasional 
and its meaning depends on who says the words. Third, an attempt to formalize 
this sentence in standard logic leads to difficulties because the very use of a proper 
name presupposes the existence of its designate. Yet, most intriguing is its epistemic 
status. For sentence (1), although not necessarily true like mathematical or logical 
truths, in some circumstances cannot be negated without a kind of contradiction. 
However, as Alfred Ayer (1953, p. 30) noted, it is not a formal contradiction. It is 
clear when one compares two sentences:
 (1′) I do not exist,
 (1″) Descartes does not exist.
Sentence (1′) seems contradictory whenever it is spoken by someone. However, 
when in (1′) the pronoun is replaced with a proper name, like in (1″), this sentence, 
unless spoken by Descartes, does not lead to any contradiction, and moreover, seems 
to be true (I ignore here the issue of difficulties of negative singular existential sen-
tences). The same proposition spoken by Descartes would therefore be contradic-
tory, but when spoken by somebody else, is not. This means that the contradiction 
that arises here is related not with the content of the proposition but with the person 
who says it.
The turning point in the analytical discussion of cogito was the famous article 
by Jaakko Hintikka (1962), which formulated a performative interpretation of the 
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Cartesian argument. The article triggered discussions that continue today (Wein-
berg 1962; Nakhnikian 1969; Rapaport 1976; Hintikka 1963; Feldman 1973; Cher-
naia 1993; Hintikka 2000; Slezak 2010). Once I tried to supplement Hintikka’s 
analysis with the formalization of cogito ergo sum in Leśniewski’s ontology (Rojek 
2003), but it turned out that the same result had been attained earlier by Eugeniusz 
Wojciechowski (Wojciechowski 1987). Hintikka tried to explain the source of cog-
ito’s indubitability with the concept of existential inconsistency. Slightly modifying 
his notation, the concept may be defined as follows:
(*) The sentence p is existentially inconsistent for the person S if the sentence ⌜p ∧ 
S exists⌝ is inconsistent (Hintikka 1962: 11).
The peculiarity of (1) lies therefore in that its negation (1′) is existentially incon-
sistent for the person uttering it. However, sentence (1″) is not inconsistent for the 
speaking person (unless it is Descartes himself). As can be seen, existential incon-
sistency is not a property of sentences in themselves, but rather of their relation to 
people speaking them. Hintikka wrote:
The inconsistency (absurdity) of an existentially inconsistent statement can in 
a sense be said to be of performatory (performative) character. It depends on 
an act or “performance”, namely on a certain person’s act of uttering a sen-
tence…; it does not depend solely on the means used for the purpose, that is, 
on the sentence which is being uttered (Hintikka 1962, p. 12).
The inconsistency to which negating cogito leads is therefore not a formal one but 
performative. “The sentence is perfectly correct as a sentence, but the attempt of 
a certain man to utter it assertively is curiously pointless” (Hintikka 1962, p. 12). 
Cogito is necessary, not logically, but pragmatically.
Hintikka’s interpretation was developed, among others, by George Nakhnikian 
(1969) and William Rapaport (1976). Nakhinian analyzed in detail three particular 
properties of cogito propositions: their incorrigibility, self-certification and prag-
matic inconsistency to which their negations lead. The latter term was to be a gener-
alisation of existential inconsistency discovered by Hintikka. Rapaport defined, after 
Nakhinian, pragmatic inconsistency as follows:
 (**) Person S is pragmatically inconsistent with respect to proposition p if and only 
if (i) S asserts that p and (ii) □(S asserts that p ⊃ ¬p) (Nakhnikian 1969: 199; 
Rapaport 1976: 65).
Both authors extended the concept of pragmatic inconsistency to other proposi-
tional acts, especially to recognizing, inferring and doubting, wherewith the last 
instance, the condition (ii) should be modified to form □(S doubts that p ⊃ p). 
Negating cogito is, naturally, pragmatically inconsistent, for it is necessary that 
if S believes, doubts or infers, then S exists. If it did not exist, it could not have 
such acts. This is especially so in the case of asserting that oneself does not exist. 
If S did not exist, it could not assert it did not exist. Hence, if S thinks it does not 
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exist, it contradicts the fact of its existence. The same is true in the case of think-
ing. For, if someone believes that does not think, he or she falls into pragmatic 
inconsistency, since that very belief is an act of thinking. It is noteworthy that 
the concept of pragmatic inconstancy is wider than the concept of an existential 
one. For example, the sentence “I have no concepts” is not existentially inconsist-
ent because it does not entail my non-existence, but it is pragmatically absurd: if 
someone thinks they have no ideas, they have some ideas by which they can think 
this (Nakhnikian 1969: 205). The definition of pragmatic inconsistency (**) also 
prevails over existential inconsistency (*), because it clearly formulates premise 
(ii) which is the ground of inconsistency.
The concepts of Hintikka’s existential inconsistency and Nakhnikian’s prag-
matic inconsistency are to explain the sources of the irrefutability of Cartesian 
cogito. Its sources are not merely the supposed clarity and distinctness of the 
concept of the thinking subject or being, but rather the situation in which the 
person utters cogito sentences. Inconsistency is not the result of abstract consid-
eration of the concept’s content but of taking pragmatic context into account. The 
irrefutability of cogito does not follow from their logical necessity, as in the case 
of mathematical or logical sentences, but precisely from the pragmatic necessity 
required by everyone who uses language.
The performative nature of cogito, discovered by Hintikka and others, to great 
extent explains Descartes’ own hesitation about its logical status. Sometimes he 
suggested that it is an inference, and sometimes that it is an insight. “It is not the 
case when someone says ‘I think, therefore I am, or I exist’—wrote Descartes—
that he is deducing existence from thought by means of a syllogism; rather he 
is recognizing it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind” 
(Descartes 2006, p. 83). Likewise, Frank believed that cogito is not an inference 
but rather a “direct perception of the self-evident connection of being and the 
possibility of being thought, existence and essence applied to the notion of cogi-
tatio” (Frank 2000, p. 590). This is so because the impossibility of thinking one’s 
own non-existence does not follow from its inconsistency with some sentences, 
which could be logically proven, but from the pragmatic inconsistency with one’s 
own existence, to which we have direct access.
Analysis of Est ens absolutum
Now I will show that, if premise (2) is accepted, then all the above-mentioned 
logical characteristics of cogito apply also to the sentence
(3) God exists.
It is so because the negation of this sentence, namely
 (3′) God does not exist,
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is, on the ground of (2), existentially and pragmatically inconsistent for any sub-
ject who utters it. Acknowledging the existence of God is therefore as evident as 
acknowledging one’s own existence. I believe that it is precisely this observation 
that contains the essence of Frank’s ontological argument for the existence of God.
First, the conjunction of the sentences “God does not exist” and “S exists” is 
as inconsistent as the conjunction of “S does not exist” and “S exists”. This is so 
because, from (3′) and (2), or rather (2′), it follows directly that S does not exist. If 
God does not exist, there are no other subjects, especially the one who reflects on it. 
Hence, if one claims God does not exist, they undermine their own existence. There-
fore, (3′) is existentially inconsistent in the sense of Hintikka for any subject S.
Second, sentence (3′) is also pragmatically inconsistent in the sense of Nakhni-
kian, meaning that it follows from the fact of one having some convictions that they 
are untrue. Let us assume that S believes that God does not exist. Since S has some 
opinion, it follows that S exists. It further follows from the fact that S exists, by the 
virtue of (2), that God exists. In other words, if S believes that (3′), then at the same 
time, from the fact that they believe (3′) it follows that (3′) is not true. Sentence (3′) 
is therefore pragmatically inconsistent for any S.
The difference between existential and pragmatic inconsistency in the case of 
Descartes’ cogito and Frank’s ontological argument lies in a fact that Frank presup-
poses an additional, non-logical premise (2). Therefore, his argument, in contrast 
to Cartesian one, is not purely pragmatic; it relies on a grave metaphysical premise. 
Nevertheless, it draws its persuasiveness (if it is persuasive at all) from the same 
pragmatic sources as cogito.
Thus, it turns out that Frank’s argument cogito ergo est ens absolutum starts with 
indubitable cogito and ends with likewise indubitable Est ens absolutum. God’s 
existence, still provided that one accepts the assumption (2), is as obvious as one’s 
own existence. An attempt to think that God does not exist leads to the same result 
as an attempt to think that “I” do not exist, i.e. to the existential and pragmatic 
inconsistencies described by analytical philosophers. So Frank was generally right 
in that his ontological proof has a similar logical status as cogito.
This likeness is also revealed in Frank’s uncertainness about the nature of his ver-
sion of ontological argument. Like Descartes, Frank sometimes suggested that this 
argument has some steps (Frank 1972, p. 136), most often, however, he stated that it 
is a simple intuitive insight. He wrote:
If one understands an “argument” as a movement of thoughts consisting in rea-
soning and explaining some truth in an indirect manner, thanks to establishing 
its relations with other truths, then ontological argument is not an argument at 
all; on the contrary, it is a movement of thoughts which leads to direct percep-
tion of primary, self-evident truth (Frank 1972, p. 120, see also pp. 136–137 
and Frank 2000, p. 548).
Comparison of ontological argument to cogito shows, however, that this direct-
ness and self-evidence does not have to be interpreted in any mystical way, even 
though such reading was sometimes suggested by Frank (Frank 1972, p. 137), and 
widely accepted by his later commentators (Obolevitch 2006, pp. 201–202; Aliaev 
2009, p. 157; Obolevitch and Wszołek 2004, p. 39; Dushin 2014, p. 53; Obolevitch 
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and Tsygankov 2017, p. 107; cf. however Antonov 2015, pp. 13–14). Frank’s onto-
logical proof, and likewise Descartes’ cogito, is simply a performative utterance in 
which the speaker realizes, with a help of some additional premises, the necessary 
implications of their own existence.
Finally, I would like to draw attention to yet another consequence of the per-
formative nature of the argument for God’s existence, seemingly neglected by Frank 
and his commentators. Standard ontological proofs analyze the very notion of God, 
while Frank’s argument starts with the existence of a thinking subject. Anselm’s 
great discovery was that if God exists, its existence is necessary. A necessary being 
is understood as such that cannot not exist, that is, in the jargon of analytical philos-
ophy, as a being that exists in every possible world. Frank clearly believed that his 
own argument also proves the existence of a logically necessary being. As he stated:
It is a primary or absolute necessity, both categorical and apodictical, combin-
ing factual irremovability with the logical indispensability. Such is the neces-
sity of being as all-encompassing all-unity, as absolute fullness of everything 
that exists and can be thought, that is, in other words, the necessity of the 
Absolute (Frank 1972, p. 122).
Hence God, to which the ontological argument led, was supposed to be “a logically 
necessary fact, namely a reality which cannot be not thought of, or, which is the 
same, the content which cannot be thought as unreal” (Frank 2000, p. 551). How-
ever, it seems that the necessity at which Frank’s ontological argument arrives is of 
a different nature to the necessity of traditional ontological proof. The necessity of 
Frank’s argument is like the necessity of cogito, of which it is an extension. How-
ever, cogito is not—as I indicated—logically necessary, but only pragmatically. For 
the existence of Descartes is accidental, although when he negates it, he falls into 
inconsistency. Likewise, Frank’s ontological proof concerns necessity only in the 
pragmatic sense. Therefore, God is necessary only due to the existence of man. In 
other words, the argument proves the existence of God only in those worlds in which 
I exist.
Paradoxically, this is not a charge against Frank’s proof. This is only because this 
modification of his argument is not a subject of standard criticism of ontological 
proofs. For Kant’s objection concerned logical necessity and here we have pragmatic 
necessity. Furthermore, the existence of God is not inferred from a mere concept 
but rather from the existence of the thinking subject. Frank’s ontological argument 
may therefore be weaker, since it does not prove the absolute necessity of God’s 
existence, but at the same time and for the same reasons is stronger than traditional 
ontological arguments, since it is at least logically correct.
Conclusions
Semen Frank generally opposed constructing arguments for God’s existence. To 
him, the only source of faith should be religious experience. Allegedly, he wanted 
to write a book Religion within the Bounds of Bare Experience, which was supposed 
to be a reply to Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (Obolevitch and 
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Tsygankov 2017, p. 111). According to Frank, rational proofs of God’s existence 
were in general impossible, redundant and dangerous. For involving God in causal 
relations threatens to reduce God to our earthly categories. Frank was also apprehen-
sive about using, in relation to God, the category of being or subject, which are not 
adequate for God’s “supra-existent reality” (Frank 1983, p. 212). To Frank, Western 
onto-theology, rationally justifying religious truths, was therefore not an ally but a 
threat to true faith.
Frank’s attitude was quite typical for Russian religious thought. As I have argued 
elsewhere, Russian philosophers, instead of a program of “philosophical theology”, 
i.e. a project of justifying religious propositions rationally, typical for the West, 
proposed a program of “theological philosophy”, which was about interpreting the 
world in the light of Christian revelation (Rojek 2016). This general attitude is also 
visible in the relation of Frank’s work to traditional arguments for the existence of 
God. As Teresa Obolevitch has noted:
Frank implies that the direction of argument should be changed. One should 
head not from the analysis of particular beings to showing the existence of 
God, but just the opposite—starting from the fundamental statement of God’s 
reality, justify the existence and possibility of cognition of things participating 
in God (Obolevitch 2006, p. 194).
Quite surprisingly, however, Frank made an exception for ontological proof. Not 
only did he not renounce the argument, but he also widely commented upon and 
creatively developed it in his writings. There is no inconsistency here, since in his 
opinion, this proof fundamentally differs from other arguments for the existence of 
God. Frank supposed that it is in fact not an inference but rather pointing to Abso-
lute being.
Here is neither possible nor impossible to prove anything. The only thing 
that is possible is to show: to point the way to the direct discernment what is 
sought… Such is the true intent of the “ontological proof”; and therefore this 
“proof”… is the only philosophical argument that at least moves on the right 
path to the goal (Frank 1983, p. 216).
However, as I have shown, Frank’s ontological argument is not such a simple act of 
intuition as it sometimes seemed to him and to his commentators. The proof has a 
logical structure which is a combination of indubitable cogito and the strong prem-
ise of the world dependency on the Absolute. While cogito endows the conclusion 
with certitude, the additional premise guarantees an achievement of God’s existence. 
Yet the premise is so strong that it can be simply regarded as an expression of pri-
mary conviction about God’s existence. As a result, Frank’s ontological argument 
seems to be in fact not a rational justification of God’s existence, but rather an expla-
nation of the relation of the world to God. In this sense, it fits perfectly with the Rus-
sian program of theological philosophy. As Obolevitch continued:
In “empirical” arguments, the idea of God… is inferred on the basis of visible 
things, while ontological proofs accept from the onset the existence of God as 
the source of all other beings. In the former case, according to Frank, an inva-
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lid leap is made from imperfect things of this world to the divine sphere; in the 
latter, it is rather the Absolute that justifies particular beings (Obolevitch 2006, 
p. 197).
Ultimately, Frank’s ontological argument turns out to be, like his whole philosophy, 
an attempt at a rational explanation, and not a justification, of one’s own faith. Such 
a view also agrees with the intriguing story that Frank revealed to his son before 
death. After all, the mysterious voice which gave him the idea for a new version of 
ontological proof did not have to convince him about its own existence.
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